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Who owns the law? In the United States, most law is published by a handful
of companies. Among the largest are Thomson Reuters, a Canadian mass-media
information firm, and RELX Group, a Dutch analytics and information
company. With very few exceptions, almost all "official" versions of state
statutory codes and regulations are published by those two companies. Thomson
Reuters also controls the National Reporter System, the caselaw reporters which
are the required version for citation before most U.S. courts.
Publication, of course, is not synonymous with "ownership." Or at least it
should not be.2 But, in the U.S. legal system, those two concepts have begun to
merge; publishers now use powerful legal tools to control who has access to the
text of the law, how much they must pay, and under what terms. This paper is
about how that transfer of control occurred, and how it is harmful.
Meaningful access to the law is a fundamental prerequisite for due process,
3
and ultimately the rule of law, yet the problem of private control is longstanding
and growing worse in the advent of electronic publishing and publisher
consolidation. Part I of this article explains why effective access to the law is so
important. Part II explains some of the challenges with control over official,
authentic legal publications and how control over that content has come to rest
with a handful of private companies. Part III reviews how those companies assert
control over published law through threat of legal actions based on copyright,
contract law, website terms of use, and even criminal statutes. Part IV concludes
with several practical and aspirational steps for information intermediaries, such
as libraries, the courts, and state legislatures to take. Ultimately, government
bears responsibility for adequately publishing its law in formats that are accessible
and useable by the public. In 2019, that means free, unrestricted online access to
official, authenticated, and reliably preserved primary legal texts. Short of that
ideal, we suggest ways to at least remove barriers for trustworthy, beneficent third
parties-of which there are many, eager and willing-to collect, preserve, and
make available official copies of the law to the public for free online.

2 The Eleventh Circuit recently opined that the People are the owners of the law: "Under
democratic rule, the People are sovereign, they govern themselves through their legislative and
judicial representatives, and they are ultimately the source of our law. Under this arrangement,
lawmakers and judges are draftsmen of the law, exercising delegated authority, and acting as
servants of the People, and whatever they produce the People are the true authors." Code
Revision Commission v. Public Resource.Org, Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
3 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593 (1834) (copyright dispute regarding private
publication of U.S. Supreme Court opinions); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
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I. WHY OWNERSHIP OF THE LAW MATTERS
A. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE

Anyone vaguely familiar with the U.S. legal system knows that ignorance of
the law is no excuse. The ancient concept, that citizens have the obligation to
understand and comply with the law, is an almost absolute presumption across
the American legal system. 4 Wrapped up in that presumption are several
assumptions about the ability of citizens to understand the law, and thus
necessarily about the ability of citizens to access the law.
The concept of notice of the law through publication has a long history. The
Greeks did it;s the Romans famously practiced it by posting the Twelve Tables
of Law in the forum, in response to the demands of the plebs.6 In the Middle
Ages, Thomas Aquinas spent considerable space questioning whether "law" was
actually "law" at all if not published for the notice of the governed. 7 Modern
commentators have even proposed that public access to legal information
deserves universal recognition as a human right.8 In America, the basic principle
of notice is embodied in the Constitution through its ex postfacto clauses 9 and
prohibition on vague laws. 10 U.S. courts have consistently articulated the simple
principle:
Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it
needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should
have free access to the opinions, and that it is against sound
public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the
earliest knowledge of the public the statutes or the decisions and
opinions of the justices.11

4 See Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV.
671 (1976).
5 Roscoe Pound, Theories ofLaw, 22 YALE L.J. 114, 117 (1912).
6 FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, HISTOluCAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW 109

(1903).

7 THoMAS

Question 90, art. 4, in
J. Henle, S.J., ed. & trans., 1993).

AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA,

AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 145 (R.

SAINT THOMAS

8 Leesi Ebenezer Mitee, The Right ofPublicAccessto Legallnformation:A Proposalforits Universal
Recognition as a Human Right, 18 GERMAN L.J. 1429, 1431 (2017).
9 U.S. CONST., art 1 § 9, cl. 3; id art. 1, 5 10, cl. 1.
10 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
11 Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 (1886).
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Although it "needs no argument," courts have explained the rationale:
Due process requires people to have notice of what the law
requires of them so that they may obey it and avoid its sanctions.
So long as the law is generally available for the public to examine,
then everyone may be considered to have constructive notice of
it; any failure to gain actual notice results from simple lack of
diligence. But if access to the law is limited, then the people will
or may be unable to learn of its requirements and may be thereby
12
deprived of the notice to which due process entitles them.
Given this constitutional commitment, its unsurprising that government
efforts to restrict access to the law, for example, through "secret law" produced
in sensitive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court proceedings, have resulted in
3
significant criticism and legal action.1 Less visible efforts-for example, the slow
surrender of control over publication of the law to commercial publishers-has
4
resulted in relatively quiet criticism and very little legal action.'
B. MEANINGFUL NOTIFICATION MEANS ONLINE PUBLICATION

If publication of the law is necessary to give citizens adequate notice of their
obligations, what kind of publication is sufficient? In 2019, adequate publication
should include online publication, accessible to the majority of the population
subject to the law.
Publication of primary legal materials (cases, statutes, and administrative
regulations) in an electronic format on the internet is a growing norm expected
5
of government institutions, both in the United States and abroad.' A variety of
legal scholars and free law advocates now argue that the public has a right to
6
access electronic legal information.1 Some go so far as to state there is, for
example, a qualified First Amendment right of public access to all court records,

Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
For an extraordinarily thorough review of the debate concerning FISA "secret law," see
Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 241, 242 (2015).
14 But see Fastcase v. Lawriter LLC, 907 F.3d 1335 (11th Cit. 2018).
15 See IFLA Statement on Government Provision of Public Legal Information in the Digital
Age (2016), https://www.ifla.org/publications/node/11064 (last visited May 10, 2018)
(recommending all governments provide access to legal information in a digital format for free
to the public and that such information be authentic and preserved).
16 See Ralph Nader, The Law Must be Free and Accessible to All - Not Secret and Profitable,
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Feb. 7, 2014, 4:31 PM) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ralphnader/the-law-must-be-free-and-accessible b_4747745.html.
12
13
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even beyond court decisions. 7 At least one international scholar has argued that
the public's right to free online legal information should be considered a human
right, arguing that anything less than freely available online legal information
does not meet the needs of citizens in today's world.18
Online publication is necessary, but not all online publication is sufficient.
While publishing online can be inexpensive and easy, the law is a unique material
that raises unique challenges regarding safeguarding and reliability. Users need to
know that the text they see is authentic and official in the same way as they did
when governments provided official print publications that reliably made
available the law in previous generations. 19
THE LAW MUST ALSO BE PRESERVED AND PROTECTED

A major but often overlooked aspect of access of the law is preservation.
While law currently in force is critical, the half-life of statutes, regulations, and
cases is significant. Litigants regularly come to law libraries seeking past versions
of codes to understand the law that governed at the time a contract became
effective, a deed was recorded, or when a conviction was entered.
With online publication of the law, preservation is a particular concern.
Because of restrictive terms of use, traditional memory institutions like libraries
and public archives are unable to retain and preserve materials. If material is
privately published and wholly privately owned, rather, the government allowing
such private ownership is relying on the commercial entity to preserve and
maintain the record of the law in perpetuity. One need only look over the history
of legal publication, which we outline below, to see why such reliance may be
problematic. The history of consolidation in the publishing industry, as well as
the reality that technology companies can go out of business overnight, indicates
that it may be unwise to identify them as stewards of the record of the law.
In contrast, traditional memory institutions like libraries and archives have
decades of experience in preserving the record of the law. When law was
exclusively published in print, libraries and archives became experts in preserving
printed materials. Not only is digital preservation still a work in progress, but any

17 See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Onkine
Access and the Loss of PracticalObscurity,
2017 U. ILL. L. REv. 1385 (2017).
18 Mitee, supra note 8, at 1468 ("Only comprehensive, up-to-date, and free official online
legal information databases of the various jurisdictions can meet the need for reliable national
and transnational legal research in today's technology-driven world.').
19 See IFLA Statement, supra note 15 (stating that mere public access is not sufficient to
meet the need for online information but rather, "Government providers also need to take
responsibility for ensuring that the content they post is available to all, at no fee, that the
content is authentic and trustworthy, and that it is preserved for public use over time in
cooperation with memory institutions.").
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attempt by memory organizations to digitally preserve law restricted by terms of
use may violate the contractual agreement of the user who accesses the material.
This sets up the uneasy concern that no one is adequately preserving the record
of the law, as any commercial entity may determine that it is not in their
20
commercial interest to continue to preserve older versions of legal documents.

II. LEGAL PUBLISHING
If one accepts that citizens' knowledge of the law is fundamental presumption
of our legal system, and that meaningful access is an important perquisite to that
knowledge, it's helpful to understand how "the law" is defined (it's not so clearcut), and how the American legal system has gone about providing access to that
law over time. We address both below.
A. DEFINING 'THE LAW"

As first year law students learn, the "law" largely comes from appellate courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies who have been delegated rule-making
authority. Particularly in a common law system like ours, the process and the
outcomes of those institutions raise interesting questions about how exactly to
define the substance of the law-the rules, precedents, and doctrines-at any
fixed moment in time. But while that substance is critical, it's also insufficient by
itself. The law is not ethereal. For all practical purposes, "the law" is the
cumulative embodiment of those institutions' decision making as reflected in
particular documents: statutes, regulations, and cases.
To understand modern challenges with access to "the law", it's critical to
focus on the particular embodiments of the law-the documents that make up
published law, and the methods used to communicate the status. This is a basic
but important point. While there is substantial literature on challenges with
private control over "the law," most scholars and courts have tended (without
saying so explicitly) to focus on the substance of."the law" as a set of rules or
precedents, without much attention at all to the characteristics of the particular
documents that come to embody these rules as published law. The particular
documents matter.
The documents that make up published law are meaningful because they
communicate to readers information about three key attributes-offiialness,
authenticity and authoriy-thatassure readers that what they are seeing is truly the
law. These attributes have always mattered but are particularly important today
20

See Margaret Maes Axtmann, The Role of CommernialPublishersin Preservation,96 LAW LIB.J.

619 (2004) stating "First, commercial publishers have played a huge role in preserving legal
information, but then as now marketability and profitability motivate many of the commercial
ventures."
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because digital text can be easily versioned, manipulated, copied, and
reorganized. These words have significance when discussing who owns the law,
because only an official, authentic and authoritative source is accorded the full
weight of "the law."
In the post-print electronic world, legislatures have begun to recognize that
issues of "officialness" and "authenticity" have special significance. Both the law
being "official" and "authentic" have legal significance in their meaning in the
Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act ("UELMA"), pertaining to states that
forgo print publication of the law and purchase online-only electronic versions
of the law. 21 "Officialness" is generally designated in statute, as UELMA requires
states to define who is the "official publisher" of the law.22
UELMA also requires "authentication," meaning that the publisher "shall
provide a method for a user to determine that the record received by the user
from the publisher is unaltered from the official record published by the
publisher." 23 At the federal level, the United States Government Publishing
Office provides official, authenticated public laws using digital signatures. 24
States like California also authenticate with digital signatures. 25 Authentication of
electronic legal materials has also been widely discussed at the international
level. 26 What the comments to UELMA make clear is that official publishers
must "designate a 'baseline' copy of all published legal material that constitutes

21 UNIF. ELEc. LEGAL MATEIUAL Act (Unif. Law Comm'n 2011) (with
prefactory note and
comments 2011), available at
lDocumFile9-d25697d-9ff-14(05eaf411w401fcleafenzgaq( See Section 3. APPLICABILITY
Comment stating "The UELMA applies to legal material designated as official and first
published in an electronic record on or after the act's effective date in the enacting state."
22 See UNIF. ELEC. LEGAL MATERIAL AcT (Unif. Law Comm'n 2011) (with prefactory note
and comments 2011), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumetnFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d25c697d-9ff9-1460-5eaf41bee40fcleaxforceDialog=0.
2 Id. at 5 5. (comment noting, "[a]s matters of public policy, a state should make its official
legal material available in trustworthy form and citizens should be able to ascertain the
trustworthiness of electronic official legal material. Reliable and accurate government legal
material is necessary to allow those who use the information to make informed decisions based

on it.'D.
24 Authentication, govinfo, https://www.govinfo.gov/about/authentication
(last visited
Mar. 15, 2019).
25 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 22000 et. seq. (2019).
26 See Guiding Pringlesto be Consideredin Developing a FutureInstrument, Hague Conference
on
Private Int'l law, hp//asshhn/ dos/0938152a4b34530-94e5c10rliop82
(stating "State
Parties are encouraged to make available authoritative versions of their legal materials provided
in electronic form. 5. State Parties are encouraged to take all responsible measures available to
them to ensure that authoritative legal materials can be reproduced or re-used by other bodies
with clear indications of their origins and integrity (authoritativeness).").
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the definitive document against which all others are compared for the purposes
27
of authenticating the legal material."
The lack of a uniform publishing system for state laws (as discussed in the
following section) means that there is no single answer about which sources
publish and make available as the law. This variation is particularly true as it
pertains to statutory publication and designation of statutes as "the law."
Although all states codify their statutes, many consider codified versions of
28
statutes prima facie evidence of the law, but not "the law" itself. For example,
in Minnesota, the "actual laws of Minnesota as passed by the legislature ... are
29
contained in the session laws." Of the states that do officially codify, there is
no uniform process for codification. For example, Washington has a statute law
30
committee made up of government officials, but defines the code reviser to be
"any lawyer or law publisher employing competent lawyers" deemed by the
statutory committee "to be qualified . . . ."31 The reviser is actually responsible
for codifying into the Revised Code of Washington all laws of a general and
32
permanent nature. Under Washington law, the reviser even has the ability to
"[c]reate new code titles, chapters, and sections of the Revised Code of
Washington ... as may be required from time to time to effectuate the orderly
33
and logical arrangement of the statutes." These new sections and organizational
34
revisions are given equal footing as those originating with the legislature. The
Revised Code of Washington that contains the certificate of the statute law
commission "shall be deemed official, and shall be prima facie evidence of the
35
Other states, such as Colorado, follow a similar
laws contained therein."
pattern.

36

See UNIF. ELEC. LEGAL MATERIAL AcT, supra note 21.
28 See State v. Boeckeri, 893 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. 2017) (citing Minn. Stat. 5 3C 13
27

(2016)).
29 Id. (quoting Granville v. Minneapolis Pub. Schol., Special Sch. Dist. 1, 732 N.W.2d 201,
108 (Minn. 2007)).
3 WASH. REV. CODE § 1.08.001 (LexisNexis 2017).
31 WASH. REV. CODE § 1.08.013 (LexisNexis 2017). (requiring the statutory committee to
select a layer or law publisher "qualified to compile the statutory law of the state of Washington
as enacted by the legislature into a code or compilation of laws by title, chapter and section,
without substantive change or alteration of purpose or intent.")
32 WASH. REV. CODE 5 1.08.015 (LexisNexis 2017).
33 WASH. REv. CODE § 1.08.015 (3) (LexisNexis 2017).
34 Id. at 5 1.08.015 (3) (LexisNexis). (new code sections "shall have the same force and effect
as the ninety-one titles originally enacted and designated as the 'Revised Code of Washington'
pursuant to the code adoption acts codified").
35 WASH. REV. CODE 5 1.08.040 (LexisNexis 2017).
36 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-5-101 (West 2017) (Colorado allows an independent reviser
"under the supervision and direction of the committee on legal services" to arrange and
publish all laws of the state of Colorado of a general and permanent nature.) By contract, the
legislature designates a publisher to produce the "official statutes" of Colorado, which "shall
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In contrast to Washington and Colorado, Pennsylvania has an official
government entity publish its statutory and administrative laws. The legislature
designated the Legislative Reference Bureau to directly work with the Legislative
Printing Clerk for the "compilation, editing,
publishing, printing,
supplementation, or revision of an official publication of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes and amendments thereto." 37 However, Pennsylvania does
not have an official, complete codification of its statutes, as it has been
undergoing an official codification for more than thirty years, with only twothirds of the codification complete. 38 Commercial publishers have stepped in to
produce unofficial codifications.39 Pennsylvania demonstrates the downside of
using an official government publisher as opposed to a commercial publisher:
the speed of organization and publication is significantly slower with a poorlyresourced government publisher than it can be than with a commercial publisher.
For this reason, as well as reasons of cost and convenience, Pennsylvania is in
the minority of states choosing to self-publish the law; most states opt to use
commercial publishers.40
Thus, scholars, attorneys, judges, and other legal researchers, in order to have
confidence they are citing the correct official sources of the law, must first locate
the statutes for that particular state that authoritatively state who has the
authority to produce and publish the law and which version of the law has the
"stamp" of officialness from the government. For any electronic versions
consulted, additional steps must be taken to ensure the electronic version is
deemed to be an authentic representation of the law.
The legal landscape for understanding what constitutes "the law" when
looking at judicial decisions has similarly changed. For centuries, judicial
opinions were the primary sources of the law, before the flowering of legislative

be the only publication of the statutes entitled to be considered as evidence in Colorado
courts." COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-5-118 (West 2017).
37 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. ANN. § 501 (West 2017).
38 See PENNSYLVANIA RESEARCH: PRIMARY SOURCES - LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIALS, h
(last visited Dec. 7, 2017).
39 See Purdon'sPennsylvaniaStatutes and ConsoldatedStatutes (Thomson Reuters) as an unofficial
compilation.
4 See Appendix indicating official publisher for statutes for each state. The Appendix was
compiled using the American Association for Law Libraries' State Online Legal Information
website,
https://community.aallnet.org/digitalaccesstolegalinformationconnittee/stateonlinelegalinf
ormation (last visited September 13, 2018) as a starting point to evaluate official publication
for the state statutory code, state administrative code, and highest state court opinions for each
of the fifty states. From there, we sought to obtain information from each state with regard to
their official publication status for each of these three legal sources.
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41
and administrative practice. Before widespread electronic publication of court
opinions, legal practitioners understood that only appellate cases constituted
42
mandatory authority when reported in official reporters for a particular court.
Formal court practice dictated which cases were designated for official
publication. 43 At the federal level, the U.S. Courts now release records indicating
that the large majority of cases terminated on the merits are still not designated
for publication.44 However, these unpublished opinions, which are designated as
45
non-precedential, are widely available through electronic resources.
Technically, these "unpublished" opinions lack precedential effect,46 yet are
47
increasingly cited by practitioners in official contexts. Questions of precedent
and what constitutes law from the judicial branch of government are more

complex in this new information environment.

41 Robert Berring, The CrumblingInfrastructureofLegal Research, in LEGAL INFORMATION AND
Ti-E DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW 272, 284 (Richard A. Danner & Frank Houdek, eds.

2008).
42 See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REv. 1931 (2008) for a
discussion about the evolving notion of authority for purposes of citation in US Law.

43 Id. at 283.
44 For 2016, approximately 88.7% of disposed cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals were

designated as unpublished. See Table B-12 U.S. CourtsofAppeals- Types of Opinions or OrdersFiled
in Cases Terminatedon the Merits, By Circuit, During the 12-Month PeriodEnding September 30, 2016,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datatables/
COURTs,
STATES
UNITED

jbb12 _0930.2016.pdf (last visited, Oct. 19, 2018).
45 However, unpublished opinions may not always be available freely through all electronic
sources. Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg independently make unpublished opinions available
on their websites, which may or may not be available on each other's platforms and also which
may or may not be available through court websites or other sources on the free web. Berring
notes, "LexisNexis and Westlaw were involved in a heated competition for the loyalty of users
and one appealing claim was that they made more opinions available. Loading these nonprecedential decisions into the database was a selling point." Betting, supra note 37 at 287.
46 The issue of whether or not technically "unreported" cases lack precedential effect is
worthy of its own, separate article. See Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions:A Convenient
Means to an UnconstitutionalEnd,97 GEo. L. REv. 621 (2009). Now, some states have gone to
vendor neutral citation format, and publish all judicial opinions online. Questions of stare
decicis and precedent in this new information environment are too numerous to discuss at

length in this article.
47 See THE COMYMITTEE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, http://www.nonpublication.com/

(last

visited Feb. 15, 2019) (arguing that "full citation and publication of appellate opinions is
necessary to allow the democracy to supervise application of the laws it maintains, correct
error, assure equal and uniform application, reconcile inconsistencies, and continually improve
the logic, purpose, consistency and justness of our laws, procedures and jurists." The website
lists a number of law review articles arguing for the need for unpublished cases to be

considered precedential legal authority.).
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Additionally, in recent years, the emergence of the concept of "secret law"
has arisen in the national security context. 48 Even with the increase in electronic
publication of unpublished, non-precedent decisions, recent research suggests
that many decisions made by the federal courts of appeals are unavailable to the
public. 49
This formalistic approach to defining what constitutes "the law" according
to legal texts and pronouncements of officialness overlooks the reality that for
many practitioners, judges, and others; citations to "the law" may be to easily
accessible forms of legal information that do not carry certainties of
"officialness." Robert Berring has noted that the infrastructure of formal legal
research has crumbled, unlocking the floodgates of questioning traditional
sources of legal authority.50
Despite this, many question whether a guarantee of "officialness" matters for
the everyday realities of use and citation. Many legal texts lack official status as
authoritative "law" but are practicably used as a legal text by lawyers and courts.
For example, in Code Revision Commission v. Public. Resource. Og, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit held that official annotations to a statutory code are "sufficiently law-like
as to implicate the core policy interests undergirding" prior judicial
pronouncements about due process and access to the law.5 1 Likewise, jury
instructions are not considered a primary legal text, but draw their authority from
statutes, regulations, and cases, as instructions attempt to simplify complex legal
language to juries. Should jury instructions thus be considered a legal text as a
practical reality, even if they lack the formal designation of "the law"? What if
jury instructions are written by state court judges who use governmental
resources to draft and compile jury instructions? Even if pattern jury instructions
lack the formalities of being "the law," should they nonetheless be made freely
available to the public if they are drafted in such a manner?

48 See Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, at 810 (2018). (Manes
defines
confidential administrative law texts as constituting secret law "if they articulate rules or

principles of general applicability that are regarded by the relevant officials as binding on their
conduct." Manes goes on to note, that for some these types of internal rules, practices and
precedents may not be thought of as the "law", but that others consider these types of
documents to constitute an "internal law.").
49 Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill, Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication
in the U.S. Courts of
Appeal, 106 GEo. L.J. 683 (finding that in immigration cases, many cases are not available, even
as unpublished decisions).
5 See Betting, supra note 37.
51 Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Og, Inc., 906 F.3d
1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2018)
(describing the three factors the court considered in determining whether the annotations,
"while not having the force of law, are part and parcel of the law." The three factors are
whether the law is "written by particular public officials who are entrusted with the exercise
of legislative power; whether the law is, by nature, authoritative; and whether the law is created
through certain, prescribed processes, the deviation of which would deprive it of legal effect.").
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B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL PUBLISHING WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO
STATE LEGAL PUBLISHING

Legal publication practices in the United States evolved out of the traditions
of legal publishing in England. Around 1841, William de Machlinia was the first
to publish a collection of English court decisions dating from the latter part of
52
the 13h century. In the period that followed from 1580-1516, roughly 125 law
53
books were published by the English presses. The first publication of statutes,
statutes beginning in 1327, first
of
Machlinia's Nova Statuta, a compilation
appeared in 1485.54
During the American colonial era, legal publishing in the American colonies
was insignificant in comparison to that in England; American bar members
55
tended to rely on English, not American, legal precedent. Even after the
Revolutionary War, virtually no American case law publication existed until
Ephraim Kirby's Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Superior Court of the State of
Connecticut(1785 - May 1788) appeared in 1789.56 Statutory law publication fared
somewhat better during the colonial era, although printing of session laws and
57
codifications was not uniform nor consistent amongst the colonies.
In the early nineteenth century, official legal publishing began in a number of
58
states, gradually replacing nominative reporters over time. Along with the
development of "official" case publishing, statutory publishing continued with a
59
The most significant development of
greater movement toward codification.
the nineteenth century came later - the emergence of the West Publishing
60
Company with its "comprehensive system of case reporting and digesting."
Digesting of cases by legal subject was a major leap forward for both lawyers and
judges that provided greater access to cases before published chronologically
only. West also introduced the National Reporter System, publishing cases

52 KEN SVENGALIs, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER's GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL, 7

(2017).
s3 Id
5

Id.

ss Id. at 7.
56 Id.
s7 Id.
58 Id. Nominative reporters in the 18th century were published by printers who "depended

upon a variety of commissions and publishing opportunities. By the beginning of the 19th
century, some specialized legal publishers like Butterworth in the UK and Stephen Gould (later
Banks-Baldwin) in the United States began to emerge. With the emergence of "official" state
publishing of cases, nominative reporters were absorbed in the numbering scheme of official

reports.
59 Id.

a

Taryn Marks,

(2015).

John

West and the Future of Legal Subscrtion Databases, 107 LAw LTBR. J. 377
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bound together with others in geographic proximity.61 West's publishing
revolution did not only confine itself to case law; it began releasing annotated
statutory codes, including the first United States Code Annotated in 1927.62
Other legal publishers emerged in the late nineteenth century, including
Michie Company, which became a leading publisher of state statutory codes. 63
Others developed to provide greater commentary and analysis of primary legal
sources including Matthew Bender and Company, Shepard's Company, and the
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company. 4 In the early part of the twentieth
century, several additional legal publishers emerged. 65
Two major events in the latter part of the twentieth century reshaped the legal
publishing world: the introduction of computer-assisted legal research and the
merger and consolidation of several major legal publishers. In 1973, "the first
computer-assisted legal research system," Lexis-Nexis, was introduced by Mead
Data Central. 66 Two years later, the West Publishing Company introduced
Wesdaw. 67 Now, for many students and practitioners, their only encounters with
legal information may come through the electronic interfaces of Westlaw or
Lexis. Additionally, with the advent of the internet, courts and other entities aside
from traditional legal publishers have found it easier than ever to publish cases,
statutes, and regulations directly to the Internet. Renowned scholar on legal
publishing and information, Bob Berring, noted that the advent of computer
assisted legal research has changed legal publishing, practice, and thought in a
number of profound ways. 68

61 Id. at 381. ("Until John West, not all courts published their opinions
and those that did
frequently delegated publication to the court's reporter.. .John West changed this by releasing
court opinions quickly and at consistent intervals, and sold the opinions at a relatively
inexpensive price.").
62 Svengalis, sapra note 47, at 8.

63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id. Some of these companies included Commerce Clearing House (now CCH)
(1913),

Bureau of National Affairs (1993), the Practising Law Institute (1933), Research Institute of
America (1935) and later the William S. Hein Company.
66 Id.

Id
68 See Robert Berting, Ring Dang Do, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 3,5 (Fall 1997) ("Publishing cases is
67

now easy. They are loaded by more and more courts directly onto the internet. Speed of
distribution is a problem that my 13-year-old son can solve. The value of editing, still powerful
in my mind, has been set aside in the rush of enthusiasm for homemade delivery systems and
snazzy search engines. Probably more crucial, there is now ten years worth of law students
who have graduated with little knowledge of the Topics and Key Numbers as part of their
universe, but with an irresistible desire to search with Boolean connectors, or even natural
language style engines, on-line. Since in many firms it is the young lawyers who do the research,
much of the research is operating with a conceptual system that is vastly different than that of
their older colleagues. The new researcher does not think in subject categories with sharply
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In the past thirty years, a wave of corporate mergers changed the landscape
69
of legal publishing. The merger and consolidation wave kicked off in 1996
when Thomson Corp. announced plans to acquire West Publishing Co.,
70
combining two of the nation's largest legal publishers. Since that time, many
other mergers occurred. Although new publishers continue to enter the market
(including a range of new publishers in the online legal publishing market), the
dominance of Reed Elsevier, which owns Lexis Nexis, and Thomson Reuters,
which owns West, continues because of their continued acquisition of other legal
publishing products. Thomson Reuters alone has acquired over twenty smaller
legal publishers including West, Research Institute of America (RIA), Barclays
71
Law Publishers, Findlaw and Gale. Ninety-three percent of Thomson Reuters
revenues are derived from electronic publishing, compared to only seven percent
72
In the Legal Division specifically, print
for continued print publications.
73
subscriptions continue to decline. In 1994, Reed Elsevier (now RELX Group)
purchased three large legal publishers: LexisNexis, Michie and Butterworths.74
In 1998, it added Matthew Bender and Shepard's to its Legal Publishing
holdings.75 More recently, it bought the online legal research start-up Lex
76
Machina, which focuses on intellectual property research.
The consolidation wave which struck legal publishing did not go
unchallenged. In 1996, when Thomson announced its plans to purchase West
for $3.425 billion, law librarians and small legal publishers loudly protested the
77
acquisition on antitrust grounds. The Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division announced a consent decree which largely overlooked concerns
expressed by aggrieved consumers, and only required that Thomson-West divest
78
itself from 51 print titles. Few national law titles of significance were included

delineated subdivisions like those in the Key Number system, instead they think in terms of
key words and connectors.").
69 SvENGALIS, supra note 47, at 8.

70 Richard C. Reuben, Merger to Yield Legal PublishingGiant, 82 A.B.A.

J. 34

(May 1996).

71 SVENGALIS, supra note 47, at 8.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
74 Id. at 10.
75 Id.
72

73

76 LexisNexis Acquires Premier Legal Analytics Provider Lex Machina, Lex Machina,
, last visited Mar. 8,

https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lexisnexis-acquires-lex-machina/

2019.

77
78

Id. at 11-12.

Id. at 12. Interestingly, many of the titles required to be divested by Thomson-West
included annotated primary law sources including United States Reports, Lanyers Edition; United
States Code Service; Deering'sAnnotated Cakfornia Code; Annotated Laws of Massachusetts; Michzgan
StatutesAnnotated; and the New York ConsolidatedLaws Service among others.
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in this divesture, signaling that regulating entities preferred to take a light touch
to consolidation among the legal publishing industry.79
Although continued objections have been raised by law librarians and
consumers of legal information, the consolidation trend in the legal publishing
market has continued.8 o Even with the emergence of new legal publishers, the
cost of large-scale consolidation has had a significant impact on the prices
consumers of legal information must pay for access and ownership of legal titles.
As Ken Svengalis, editor of the L.gal Informaion Buying Guide notes, "[fjrom the
perspective of the legal information consumer, the future, at least on the cost
front, appears relatively bleak, as exemplified by the recent double-digit price
increase from both Thomson Reuters and LexisNexis Matthew Bender. While
the Internet offers new opportunities for the exchange of legal information, it
had only limited impact on the world of value-added legal information which will
remain under the control of the big three for the foreseeable future." 81
Accompanying consolidation of large legal publishers, electronic publishing
of legal information has begun to shift primary methods of publication for legal
materials from print to electronic-only publication. 82 These shifts to electronic
publication mean that in some states, there is no print publication, either from a
government source or a commercial publisher. 83
These developments in traditional publishing are significant in a world where
primary legal information, both in official and unofficial formats, is found online.
As this brief history illustrates, at no time were primary legal materials published
in a unified, consistent manner. Rather, the introduction of online publishing has
only further complicated an already complicated print publishing environment.
As this brief history demonstrates, in state legal publishing, publishing primary
law has been accomplished through contractual relationships with for-profit

Id. at 12-13.
8 Id. at 13-15.
81 Id. at 15. The big three publishers Svengalis includes are RELX Group, Wolters Kluwer
(publisher of Aspen Law & Business, CCH, and Wiley Law Publications among others), and
Thomson Reuters. According to Svengalis's research, Thomson Reuters Worldwide Sales in
2016 came to $11.2 billion, versus $8.689 billion for RELX Group and $4.679 billion for
Wolters Kluwer.
82 See the author-created "Fifty State Survey Addendum to Who Owns the Law? Why
We
Must Restore Public Ownership of Legal Publishing" available at https://
libraries.mercer.eduursa/handle/10898/9937 for a complete view of current publishing
patterns for the fifty states. The 50 State Survey includes information about whether state
statutes, administrative codes, and the highest court opinions are officially published in print
or online
83 See id. The 50 state survey indicates which states have ceased to publish official
versions
of statutory codes, administrative codes, or the highest court opinions in print and rely on
online only publication.
7
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private publishers. In the online publishing environment, frequently these publicprivate relationships are unchanged.
The shift in publication patterns from print to electronic poses a number of
challenges. Advocates of the online publication of legal information celebrate the
84
internet as a tool that makes government information more widely available.
Instead of trekking to a library or government office to access a print version of
a statutory or administrative code, most citizens can access the same information
at their fingertips, wherever they are. Access no longer requires traditional
gatekeepers of information, like librarians or lawyers.
Although many states continue to publish "official" versions of the law in
print, an increasing number of states "are eliminating certain print publications
altogether." 85 For example, in Georgia, the state no longer contracts with a
publisher to produce an official print publication of the Georgia Administrative
Code.86 While the increasing availability of legal information in an electronic
format has disseminated legal materials to a wider audience, it also presents a
new set of challenges, particularly when considering vanishing print publications
in favor of electronic-only materials. In the world of online legal information,
new questions about authenticity, access to and preservation of legal information
also emerge. Stakeholders of online legal information correctly identified some
of these important issues in the crafting of the Uniform Electronic Legal Material
87
Act (UELMA), now the law in 18 states and the District of Columbia. UELMA
mandates at a high level that all official electronic legal materials be "(1)
authenticated, by providing a method to determine that it is unaltered; (2)
preserved, either in electronic or print form; and (3) accessible, for use by the
88
public on a permanent basis." The Act itself does not specify a particular means
of accomplishing these aims, but instead leaves to each state adopting UELMA
to determine how the goals of the Act will be achieved.
Because UELMA only addresses online access, authenticity, and permanence
in a general sense, it does not confront the thornier issues. In fact, Uniform Law
Commissioners intentionally navigated around some of these conflicts in their

8 See "Declaration on Free Access to the Law" from the Free Access to the Law
Movement, available at http://falm.info/declaration/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
85 UNIF. ELEC. LEGAL MATERIAL ACT, supra note 21.
86 See "Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia" available at
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/General/rules-and-regulations (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
87 See id. The law has been adopted in Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.

88 Id.
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drafting of UELMA.89 This article largely focuses on two issues that remain in a
post-UELMA world that were purposely not addressed in UELMA: copyright 9
and the "contractual relationship between a state and a commercial publisher
with which the state contracts for the production of its legal material." 9
Although these issues are unaddressed in UELMA, they play crucial roles in
determining whether or not the goals of UELMA can truly be met. This article
sets out these additional challenges of an electronic-only legal publication
environment unaddressed in UELMA, but crucially affecting the public's right
to access legal information and the dual government and library responsibility to
preserve legal information. In particular, having ceded any position on issues of
copyright, private publication of legal information, and restrictive uses of online
information, UELMA ignores issues of private publication of government
information. It is hard to see how the goals of UELMA can be met if these
additional challenges of the online legal information environment are not
addressed.

III. HOW COMMERCIAL PUBLISHERS EXERCISE CONTROL OVER
THE LAW
Our central premise is that today, official and authentic published law is not
adequately accessible online in ways that most people can access. There are many
policy, definitional, and technical challenges that stand in the way. However, legal
protections that favor private publishers pose some of the most significant
barriers. Some of the legal tools that publishers use are well known; many cases
and law review articles address the arguments regarding copyright protection
over the law. 92 More recently, in the face of pervasive terms of use that are nearly
89 See UNIF. ELEC. LEGAL MATERIAL AcT (Unif. Law Comm'n 2011), supra note 20, at 2-3
(discussing why the act did not require specific technologies for authentication and

preservation.).
90 Id. at 3 ("[I]his act does not deal with copyright issues, leaving those to federal law and

state practice.").
9' Id
92 See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopoking the Law: The Scope ofCopyrght Protection

for Law Reports and StatutoU Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1989) (addressing copyright
protection in the context of the legal contest between LexisNexis and Westlaw over the
copyrightability of West's reporters); Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: IntellectualProperyRights
in Primay Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 174 (1998); Michael W.

Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 741, 742 (2006); Beth
Ford, Comment, Open Wide the Gates of LagalAccess, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 540 (2014); Elizabeth
Scheibel, Note, No Copnyrght in the Law: A Basic Princp, Yet a Continuing Battle, 7 CYBARIS AN
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 350 (2016) (discussing recent developments, including the Georgia v.
Public.Resource. Org lawsuit regarding copyright in the Georgia Annotated Code, and the impact
of the Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act); Katie Fortney, Note, Ening Copyrght Claims
in State Primat Legal Materials: Toward an Open Source legal System, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 59 (2010);
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always present and required for access online content, breach of contract claims
have become an even bigger complication. On the horizon are yet other more
severe legal controls, such as computer crime claims, which are just beginning to
weigh on potential reuses of the law. We address each in turn, below.
A. COPYRIGHT LAW

Copyright law is amongst the most frequently litigated controls over legal
information. Starting in the early nineteenth century, a body of law developed
articulating the basic principle that copyright does not extend to edicts of
government. In the 1834 case Wheaton v. Peters, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered
a straightforward rule in determining a reporter's privilege in printing Supreme
Court cases: "[n]o reporter of the decisions of the supreme court has, nor can he
have, any copyright in the written opinions delivered by the court; and the judges
93
In 1888, the
of the court cannot confer on any reporter any such right."
Supreme Court again held in Banks v. Manchesterthat the same rule applies to state
court opinions: "[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic
exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation
of a constitution or a statute."

94

Lower courts have since applied the same basic rule to "the law" as embodied
95
and local codes and
in the text of statutes and statutory compilations,
96
claims of copyright in
to
register
refused
has
Office
Copyright
The
ordinances.
from registration
excluding
specifically
edicts,"
"government
what it terms
rulings, public
administrative
decisions,
judicial
enactments,
"legislative
eligibility
97
materials."
legal
official
of
types
similar
or
ordinances,
Despite what appears to be a clear rule against copyright protection over the
law, publishers continue to assert copyright to effectively prevent free access to
official legal publications. In modern cases, copyright is asserted in two different
ways. First, rights are asserted over secondary materials-annotations,
headnotes, etc.-which are inextricably linked to the legal publication in which
the law is communicated. Courts have generally held that these surrounding

&

Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyrightand Copyright-Like Controls over Government
Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 999, 1000-01 (1995).
93 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 593 (1834). See also Craig Joyce, Wheaton v. Peters: The
Untold Story of the Early Reporters, 1985 S. CT. HISTORICAL Soc'Y YEARBOOK 35.
94 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
95 Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 61 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866) (finding no copyright protection
for statutory compiler of Minnesota state statutes).
96 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002); Bldg. Officials
Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cit. 1980).
97 U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyrght Office Practicesf 313.6(c)(2) (3d ed. 2017).
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materials are distinguishable from the core legal text and are in many cases
protectable. For example, judicial opinions authored by the court are generally
not protectible, but "the publisher [of a volume of law reports] may copyright
any part of a published decision that represents his own labor in the production,
such as headnotes, statements of each case, and arguments of counsel." 98
Similarly, annotations added to statutes, and perhaps even the arrangement
and selection of statues into codes themselves, have been treated as
copyrightable. 99 Some secondary additions to legal texts are minimal-West has
claimed copyright over the page numbers that it added to the text of judicial
opinions printed in West reporters 00-while others make for a more robust case
that their additions to the text of the law are creative and therefore copyrightable,
including enhancements designed to make the substance of the law more
readable and more easily findable. 0
It has long been the case that private legal publishers independently undertake
creation of these additional, surrounding materials, to publish and sell their own
versions of state statutes or administrative codes. 102 But when publishers of the
original source publication-i.e., the official, authentic legal publicationinclude as integral parts of those publications secondary materials, how should
copyright law protect those expressions? A recent case highlights the issue:
Georgia, in 2015, through the Georgia Code Revision Commission, brought a
copyright infringement lawsuit against Public.Resource.org for copying and
distributing online the Official Code of Georgia (OCGA). 103 The Conmmission
had contracted with LexisNexis to produce this OCGA, complete with
annotations and other integrated legal research tools such as legislative history
references.'1 It also required Lexis to post an unannotated version of the OCGA

98 State ex rel. Helena Allied Printing Council v. Mitchell, 105 Mont. 326, 340 (1937); see
also Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649 (1888) ("such work of the reporter, which may be
the lawful subject of copyright, comprehends ... that order of arrangement of the cases, the
division of the reports into volumes, the numbering and paging of volumes. . . .").

9 See e.g., Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. Intern., Inc. v. Code Tech., Inc., 79-2472-MA, 1980
WL 1169, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 1980) ("compilation and analysis" treated as copyrightable).
1oo Compare W. Publ'g. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (8th Cit. 1986)
(noting that the arrangement of judicial opinions is sufficiently creative to justify copyright
protection), with Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ'g. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cit. 1998)
(concluding that since "internal pagination of West's case reporters does not entail even a
modicum of creativity, the volume and page numbers are not original components of West's
compilations and are not themselves protected by West's compilation copyright").
101 See, e.g., West Pub. Co. v. Lawyer's Cooperative Pub. Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cit. 1887)
(upholding a judgment in favor of West against Lawyer's Cooperative for the unauthorized
copyright of West's headnotes and digests, both tools used to aid discovery of the law).
102 E.g., compare West Annotated General Statutes of North Carolina (private,
unofficial) vs.
North Carolina General Statues (Lexis; official).
103 Code Rev. Comm'n. v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
10 Id. at 1354.
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105
online for free access, which Lexis did subject to a website terms of use.
Public.Resource.org copied from the print all 186 volumes of the OCGA and
106
posted them on its website for free download. The suit was before the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the OCGA prevailed, and
PublicResource.org appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The District Court concluded that such annotations are protectable by
copyright. The Court explained that the "official code publication controls over
unofficial compilation" and that attorneys who cite the unofficial versions "do
107
the court carefully parsed the OCGA for its protectable
so at their peril,"
surrounding elements and unprotectable core legal text. "The entire O.C.G.A. is
not enacted into law by the Georgia legislature and does not have the force of
law."108 Thus, the Court concluded without difficulty that the annotations and
other creative additions were copyright-protected. Like those cases involving
headnotes and other annotated additions,109 the court concluded that those
additional materials were separable from unprotectable text of the law and
110
independently protected by copyright.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a more practical approach,
looking less at the formal status of each element of the text, and instead focusing
on the attributes and intent of those who created it.111 The Court summarized its

approach:
[O]ur ultimate inquiry is whether a work is authored by the
People, meaning whether it represents an articulation of the
sovereign will, our analysis is guided by a consideration of those
characteristics that are the hallmarks of law. In particular, we rely
on the identity of the public officials who created the work, the
authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work
was created. These are critical markers. Where all three point in
Id. at 1353-54. Reviewed in more detail in Part XX.
Id. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of law in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary
9
Judgment, Code Rev. Commn. V. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No 1:15-cv-025 4 (N.D. Ga.
May 17, 2016). In the Agreement for Publication, Lexis/Matthew Bender is specifically
required to post an unannotated version of the OCGA to the web that can be accessed by the
public (See Agreement for Publication at 2.5)
107 O.C.G.A.
1-1-1 (2018) (Lexis case note for Georgia ex rel. Gen. Ass'y v. Harrison Co.,
548 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982), orders vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
105

106

108 Code Rev. Comm'n, supra note 90, at 1356.
109 Id. (citing W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir.
1928); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617
(1888)).
110 Id.
111 See Code Rev. Comm'n for Gen. Assemb. Of Ga. V. Public.resource.org, Inc., 906 F.3d
1229 (11th Cit. 2018).
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the direction that a work was made in the exercise of sovereign
power-which is to say where the official who created the work
is entrusted with delegated sovereign authority, where the work
carries authoritative weight, and where the work was created
through the procedural channels in which sovereign power
ordinarily flows-it follows that the work would be attributable
to the constructive authorship of the People, and therefore
uncopyrightable.112
In analyzing the O.C.G.A., the Eleventh Circuit identified several factors that
led it to conclude that "the annotations are legislative works created by Georgia's
legislators in the exercise of their legislative authority," and therefore
uncopyrightable." 3
The first factor is the close identification of the authorship with the
legislature.114 Although Lexis prepared the annotations, the court explained that
the legislature was in control and the annotations were created pursuant to a
detailed contract under "punctiliously specific instructions." 1 5 It also states that
the annotations are to be prepared under the "direct supervision" and with the
"intimate involvement" of the Georgia Code Revision Commission, which the
Court viewed as an arm of the state legislature.116
The second factor is the close association of the annotations with the legallybinding text of the statutes. As a matter of law, the annotations were to be
"merged" with the statutory text to produce the O.C.G.A.17 "While this does
not mean that annotations, by virtue of appearing alongside statutory text, are
suddenly possessed of binding legal effect, it does mean that their combination
with the statutory text imbues them with an official, legislative quality."" 8 "[A]
full understanding of the laws of Georgia necessarily includes an understanding
of the contents of the annotations. In this way, the annotations are clearly laden
with legal significance."" 9
With the third factor, the court found that the process used to adopt the
annotations-that the "Georgia General Assembly voted to adopt the
annotations as prepared by the Commission as an integral part of the official
Code"-was highly significant as evidence that the annotations were in fact

112

Id at 1232-33 (emphasis omitted).

113

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

114
"s
116

117

1233.
1248.
1243.
1243-44.

1248.

118 Id. at 1249.
119 Id.
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communications from the legislature speaking as representatives of the public in
120
their official capacity.
The Eleventh Circuit's approach in Public.Resource. Org is helpful to advocates
for public access to the law because while annotations and statutory text are
theoretically easy to separate from the core legal text, they are not practically. The
public who seeks access to the official, authenticated code of Georgia must go
through Lexis or have no access at all. If such content were protectable, it would
mean either paying Lexis for a copy or, at a minimum, agreeing to contractual
21
Similarly, libraries
terms of use that limit what the user can do with the law.1
and other information intermediaries that seek to post online free copies of the
O.C.G.A. would not be able to because they could not practically separate the
core text from the additions. Moreover, even if they could, by virtue of changing
the document-removing text, altering formatting-the resulting document
would no longer be the "Official Code of Georgia Annotated" with all the
markers of authenticity and officialness that imbue the O.C.G.A. with value as
"the law" to begin with. The resulting derivative material would just be another
unofficial compilation that users should cite at their peril.
While the Eleventh Circuit decision in OCGA is undoubtedly positive for
would-be users of that text, it does not mean that all "official" legal publications
containing third-party materials are necessarily free from copyright. Many such
publications in other states are not created with such "intimate involvement"
from their respective government agency sponsors, nor are many enacted with a
122
Many
process that involves the legislature to the extent required in Georgia.
text
statutory
the
with
"merged"
be
to
law,
of
matter
as
a
required,
not
are also
23
noted
As
O.G.C.A.1
the
for
requires
Georgia
of
State
the
as
way
same
in the
above, the process for creation of official state legal publications varies
significantly. Public.Resource.Orgmay provide a persuasive rationale to conclude
that legal publications in some states are, as whole publications, unprotectable,
while in other states the same rationale could indicate that the third-party content
incorporated into "official" citable publications -remains protected by copyright
and therefore cannot be reproduced.
Beyond third-party additive content such as annotations, the second situation
in which copyright raises challenges is with privately developed content, such as
technical standards, incorporated either directly or by reference as part of binding
law. 124 In recent years the development of law outside of legislatures and courts

120

Id. at 1253.

121

Id.

Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1248.
See Pamela Samuelson,QuestioningCopyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193, 219 (2007)
(stating that standards raise broader questions about the scope of copyright protection as well);
122

123
124
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has become common place.1 25 For reasons of efficiency, technical expertise, and
standardization, much of the substance of modern law was developed first by
private entities. Across both state and federal law, everything from basic contract
law under the Uniform Commercial Codel 26 to highly technical material safety
standards1 27 can be traced back to private actors. For the most part, the benefits
of private development of the law are viewed as significant and are
encouraged, 128 though not without critics.1 29
Because we are primarily concerned with access to publication of authentic,
official legal texts, we focus on texts incorporated directly into official legal texts.
However, materials incorporated by reference pose significant challenges as well.
In some circumstances it may be that those texts should be incorporated into
official legal publications, but aren't. For directly incorporated content, two cases
provide the clearest guidance. The first involves a copyright infringement suit
brought by the Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc.
(BOCA), a private non-profit organization that had for many years worked to
develop the BOCA Basic Building Code.1 30 The code was developed by BOCA
jointly with representatives from industry, code enforcement officials, designers
and other stakeholders, and was intended to be adopted by state and local
jurisdictions.131 Massachusetts was one such adopter, which contracted with

Shubha Ghosh, Igal Code and the Need for A Broader Functionality Doctrine in Copyrght, 50 J.
COPYRIGHT SocY. U.S.A. 71, 82 (2003).
1
As of August 2016, the National institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department
of Commerce, lists over 23,000 standards that have been largely created by private
organizations and incorporated by reference into federal law. NIST, Standards Incorporated by
Reference (SIBR) Database, (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/standardsgov/what-wedo/federal-policy-standards/sibr
126 Developed by a joint committee of the American Law Institute
and the Uniform Law
Commission. See Permanent Editorial Boardfor the Unform Commercial Code, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/governance/comnittees/joint-committees/. ALI
asserts copyright over the UCC and requires permission for reuse.
127 See Am. Socy. for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.,
13-CV-1215 (TSC),
2017 WL 473822, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017).
128 See Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organigationsand Public Law, 22 WM.
& MARY BILL
RTs. J. 497, 499 (2013); see also Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government
Age, 36 HARv. J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 131, 145-47 (2013); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (speaking to
incorporation by reference in federal regulations); Approval ProceduresforIncorporationby Reference,
47 Fed. Reg. 34,107 (Aug. 6, 1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. 5 51.1 et seq.); 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267
(Nov. 7, 2014); 58 Fed.Reg. 57643, 57644-45 (1993) (directing federal agencies to adopt
private standards "whenever practicable" so as to "eliminate[] the costs to the Government
of developing its own standards").
12 Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatiing Copyrht, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 387, 458 (2003)
("Privatizing law making ignores the values of deliberative democracy.").
130 Bldg. Officials &CodeAdm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730
(1st Cir. 1980).
131 Id. at 732.
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132
The defendant in the suit, Code
BOCA for distribution of its code.
133
Technology (CT), copied the text and republished it in its own print edition.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against CT, which CT
134
appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, CT argued that the text of the code, insofar as it had been adopted
35
into law by the Massachusetts legislature, was in the public domain.1 Citing the
line of cases noted above that statutes and judicial opinions are not protectable
36
by copyright, the court agreed.1 Notably, the court focused its analysis on the
source of authority for the code, and though it did not use the term "official" or
"authentic," it clearly indicated that the value in the code comes not just from
what it says, but who it is that says it and how that actor communicates it.137
Rejecting the argument that prior cases had found edicts of government to
be in the public domain merely because their authors are employees of the

government,1 3 the court observed that,
The cases hold that the public owns the law not just because it
usually pays the salaries of those who draft legislation, but also
because, in the language of Banks v. West, 27 F. 50, 57
(C.C.D.Minn.1886), "Each citizen is a ruler,-a law-maker." The
citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners,
regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the law
derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed
39
through the democratic process.1

132

I.

133 Id.
134' Id.
135 Id. at 733
136

Id.

137

Id. at 734.

138 Id. ("BOCA argues that the Massachusetts building code, unlike judicial opinions and
statutes, is principally the work not of government employees, but of itself-a private
organization operating with little or no government support which serves the needs both of
the state and its citizens by preparing and updating the code, and furnishing copies as needed.
BOCA's argument implies that the rule of Wheaton v. Peterswas based on the public's property
interest in work produced by legislators and judges, who are, of course, government
employees.").
139 Id.
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The court went on to reason that more fundamental principles of due process
should also drive the analysis:
Along with this metaphorical concept of citizen authorship, the
cases go on to emphasize the very important and practical policy
that citizens must have free access to the laws which govern
them. This policy is, at bottom, based on the concept of due
process. Regulations such as the Massachusetts building code
have the effect of law and carry sanctions of fine and
imprisonment for violations. (citation omitted) Due process
requires people to have notice of what the law requires of them
so that they may obey it and avoid its sanctions. So long as the
law is generally available for the public to examine, then everyone
may be considered to have constructive notice of it; any failure
to gain actual notice results from simple lack of diligence. But if
access to the law is limited, then the people will or may be unable
to learn of its requirements and may be thereby deprived of the
notice to which due process entitles them. CT points out that the
holder of a copyright has the right to refuse to publish the
copyrighted material at all and may prevent anyone else from
doing so, thereby preventing any public access to the
material. . . . . We cannot see how this aspect of copyright
protection can be squared with the right of the public to know
the law to which it is subject.1 40
Nevertheless, the court in BOCA recognized that incentives for the development
of private standards were important as well. In reversing the preliminary
injunction and sending the case back to the district court, the court explained
that,
[g]roups such as BOCA serve an important public function;
arguably they do a better job than could the state alone in seeing
that complex yet essential regulations are drafted, kept up to date
and made available. Since the rule denying copyright protection
to judicial opinions and statutes grew out of a much different set
of circumstances than do these technical regulatory codes, we
think BOCA should at least be allowed to argue its position
fully....

14 Id.
141

Id. at 736.

.141
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142
In 2002, the Fifth Circuit in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress, directly
addressed the issue that BOCA avoided: the copyright status of a model building
code created by the Southern Building Code Congress, International (SBCCI)
143
The
and adopted by two north Texas municipalities, Anna and Savoy.
and
code
building
municipalities'
the
defendant in that suit, Peter Veeck, copied
that
website
a
noncommercial
posted it online to his website, RegionalWeb,
provided information about north Texas. SBCCI sued, claiming copyright
infringement. 144 Accepting without discussion that SBCCI had a valid copyright
145
the court framed the key question as
interest in its model code standing alone,
whether SBCCI retains "the right wholly to exclude others from copying the
model codes after and only to the extent to which they are adopted as 'the law'
146
of various jurisdictions?"
1 47
for two
The Veeck court concluded that Veeck could copy the code
they
because
reasons: (1) enacted laws are unprotectable "facts" under copyright
1 48
are the "unique, unalterable expression of the 'idea' that constitutes local law,"
precedent
and (2) Banks and other Supreme Court cases (as well as persuasive
from the First Circuit in BOCA) require that "'the law,' whether it has its source
in judicial opinions or statutes, ordinances or regulations, is not subject to federal
149
copyright law."
With respect to the latter of the reasons, the court spent considerable space
limiting its holding to a specific definition of "the law." The court held that
"when Veeck copied only 'the law' of Anna and Savoy, Texas, which he obtained
from SBCCI's publication, and when he reprinted only 'the law' of those
150
Indeed, the court said,
municipalities, he did not infringe SBCCI's copyrights."
"[o]ur decision might well be the opposite, if Veeck had copied the model codes
as model codes, or if he had indiscriminately mingled those portions of 'the law'
of Anna and Savoy adopted by their town councils with other parts of the model
151
codes not so adopted."

142

293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).

143

Id.
Id.

144

145 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Intern., Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cit. 2002).
146

Id.

147

Id

14 Id. at 801-02 ("SBCCI is creating copyrightable works of authorship. When those codes
are enacted into law, however, they become to that extent 'the law' of the governmental entities
and may be reproduced or distributed as 'the law' of those jurisdictions.").
149 Id. at 800.
150

Id

151

Id. at 800 n. 14.
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The court focused, with somewhat conflicting statements, on the authorship
of the code. Citing BOCA, the court held that mere public employment of the
authors had little to do with who is attributed authorship of the law:
[e]ven when a governmental body consciously decides to enact
proposed model building codes, it does so based on various
legislative considerations, the sum of which produce its version
of 'the law.' In performing their function, the lawmakers
represent the public will, and the public are the final 'authors' of
the law.1 52
Yet later, the court felt compelled to distinguish negative precedent from the
Second and Ninth Circuits by asserting that those cases were different because
the third party material at issue was "created by private groups for reasons other
than incorporation into law," and for which copyright incentives may have
different effects.' 53
A series of cases from the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have addressed
the issue of material incorporated by reference but not reproduced itself in an
official legal publication. In 1994, the Second Circuit in CCC Information Services,

Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc, addressed the copyright status of an
automobile valuation book, The Red Book, that was identified as a standard of
reference in several states' insurance laws.1 54 The Court declined to find that The
Red Book entered the public domain because it had been so incorporated:
We are not prepared to hold that a state's reference to a
copyrighted work as a legal standard for valuation results in loss
of the copyright. While there are indeed policy considerations
that support CCC's argument, they are opposed by
countervailing considerations. For example, a rule that the
adoption of such a reference by a state legislature or
administrative body deprived the copyright owner of its property
would raise very substantial problems under the Takings Clause
of the Constitution. We note also that for generations, state
education systems have assigned books under copyright to
comply with a mandatory school curriculum. It scarcely extends
CCC's argument to require that all such assigned books lose their

152
153
154

Id. at 799.
Id. at 805.
44 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1994).
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copyright-as one cannot comply with the legal requirements
155
without using the copyrighted works.
Next in the Ninth Circuit came PracticeManagementInformation Corp. v. American
MedicalAssociation.156 That case addressed whether a medical procedure coding
system developed by the American Medical Association (AMA) and
incorporated by reference into regulations promulgated by a federal agency
57
regarding requirements for Medicare and Medicaid billing.1 The regulation
58
required physicians to exclusively use the AMA system.s The court's analysis
was similar to that in BOCA. It first examined the authorship of the standard,
though in this case the court apparently did not find relevant the metaphorical
"citizen-author"; it concluded that most significant was that the AMA authors
59
The court also addressed the due
were not employees of the government.'
process arguments, but concluded that they did not foreclose copyright
protection because "[t]here is no evidence that anyone wishing to use the [AMA
code] has any difficulty obtaining access to it," and that AMA's right under the
Copyright Act to forego publication was not realistic because the AMA would
60
have no incentive to do so.1
Later, in County of Suffolk, New York v. FirstAmericanRealEstateSoluions,161 the
Second Circuit addressed copyright in county-produced tax maps that were
copied and republished by First American. Interpreting Banks and drawing from
CCC Information Senices and PracticeManagement, it developed a two-factor analysis
for whether a given work is in the public domain: "(1) whether the entity or
individual who created the work needs an economic incentive to create or has a
proprietary interest in creating the work and (2) whether the public needs notice
62
of this particular work to have notice of the law."1 The court concluded that
tax maps did require incentives, and that for the notice question, the current
63
availability was satisfactory.1 It concluded so for two reasons: (1) the tax maps
created no independent legal obligation on anyone and (2) the taxes were
required to be disclosed upon request the maps to a requester under the state's
freedom of information law, and relatedly, there was no allegation of any person
164
owing property tax having difficulty obtaining access to the maps.

'55

Id.

156

121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), amended, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
121 F.3d at 517.

157

158 Id.
159

Id.

160
161

Id. at 519.
261 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2001).

162

Id

163

Id. at 194-195.

164

Id. at 195.
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Finally, in ASTM v. Public.Resource.Org, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
most recently addressed a case involving use of technical standards produced by
ASTM and several other SSOs that had been incorporated by reference into
federal regulations. 165 Public.Resource.Org posted copies of those standards
online to fulfill its mission "to make the law and other government materials
more widely available."' 66 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit accepted, at least as a
matter of argument, that incorporation by reference of third-party content into
"the law" raises a "serious constitutional concern."1 67 Ultimately, though, the
court declined to address them, instead opting to avoid those questions in favor
of first looking to Public.Resource.org's fair use defense which the court
suggested, but did not decide, may be viable (the court remanded to the district
court for further development of the facts).1 68
Third-party content raises special challenges. Surely, not everything
referenced by a legislature or court should immediately be stripped of copyright
protection. For example, if a court takes judicial notice of a fact in a local
newspaper, should that paper now enter the public domain? Just as surely, if a
legislature enacts and republishes a model code, giving it the same force and
effect of law that the legislature as if it created it itself, the public should be able
to use that law on the same terms as any other law. From the public's due process
perspective, the identity or incentives of the original creator do not matter much;
if the work referenced is given authority by a valid lawmaking body, it should be
treated as such.
These cases deserve a more complete critique than we can give them here.
Our purpose in reviewing them is to highlight how they add yet another layer to
the uncertainty and risk of accessing and using authentic, official law. The
obstacle to users for accessing their legal obligations can in some cases be
especially severe for materials that are propriety and expensive. So, although
there some clear guideposts marking out the application of copyright to things
such as statutory text or judicial opinions, modern legal publishing, which is
highly reliant on third-party publishers and third-party content, has, as a result,
led to copyright law posing a significant barrier to preservation and access of
"the law" both narrowly and broadly defined.

165

Am. Socy. for Testing and Materials, et al. v. Public.Resource.Org,
Inc., 896 F.3d 437,

444 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
16

Id.

167

Id. at 447.

168

Id. at 448-54.
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B. CONTRACTS AND TERMS OF SERVICE
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Perhaps even more problematic than copyright are the contractual terms of
169
use that attach to many commercially-contracted online access portals. Users
are faced with terms of service on almost every website that they visit, including
websites owned by private publishers responsible for publishing the official
70
As Bradley E. Abruzzi pointed out with regard to website
record of the law.1
is the crux of it: the delicate balance that Congress and
"[t]his
Terms of Service,
with respect to copyrights comes to nothing if state
undertaken
the courts have
purveyors to impose their own rewrites on the
content
contract law empowers
17
consumers."
of
law
72
Many cases address the validity of these agreements.1 Issues of assent and
the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses have been heavily litigated in
173
Because most commercial websites
"browsewrap" and "clickwrap" contracts.
terms of use agreements, this
contain
law
that publish official versions of the
forces any user of the law to submit to contractual obligations that restrict their
rights to use the official record of the law. For example, to access the free,

169 See 50 State Survey supra note 82, as 50 state survey contains information on which
websites with primary lay maintain terms of use for those websites.
170 Id

171 Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyrght, Free Expression, and the Enforceability of "PersonalUse-Only"
and Other Use-Restrictive Online Terms of Use, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 85,

120 (2009).
172 See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Browsenrp

Inc., Customer
Agreements, 95 A.L.R. 6th 57 (Originally published in 2014); In re Zappos.com,
Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012) (applying Nevada law).
173 "Clickwrap" contracts, where the user must click-through a terms of service "contract"
affirmatively, have generally been found to be enforceable by the courts. "Browsewrap"
contracts, where a website user must visit a separate link in order to view the terms of use for
a website and do not require the user to affirmatively assent to their terms. Their enforceability
as contracts has been the subject of more dispute among the courts.
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unannotated code of Mississippi, Georgia, and many other states, one must
assent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New York for the resolution
of any disputes.1 74
It is noteworthy that this creation of potential contractually-based legal
liability for users of the record of the law is entirely created because of the online
environment. When users of the record of the law relied on print publication, no
"terms of use" existed. 75 Nonetheless, this type of litigation has largely been
successful for content owners, even when users of websites have argued that
terms of use are used to preempt federal copyright law. One seminal case on this
issue is ProCD v. Zeidenberg.'7 6 Although this case addressed the validity of a
shrinkwrap license from the sale of software, it stood for the principle that the
enforcement of the contract under state law was not preempted by federal
copyright law.' 77 In Judge Easterbrook's opinion, to support his determination
that state law contract claims for software licenses are not pre-empted by
copyright law, he offered the example of a student using law on Lexis "containing
public domain documents" opining that the student couldn't resell his access to
the documents at a much higher rate. 78 Of course, unaddressed in Judge
Easterbrook's decision is the situation we are currently confronted with - when
the "public domain documents" themselves are only published and locked
behind a strict terms of use agreement. In Judge Easterbrook's world, the records
of the law were also available in their official forms in print. Although other
courts have concluded that there may be some instances in which copyright law
is not preempted by state contract law, the parameters of the decision in ProCD
have largely stood.' 79
This threat to the free use of the official record of the law is currently the
subject of active litigation involving the Rules and Regulations of the State of
Georgia involving the official publisher of the Rules, Lawriter, (under contract
with the Secretary of State of Georgia to comply with its statutory obligation to
174 See

Terms

and

Condition,

LEXIsNEXIs,

https://www.lexisnexis.com/terms/

Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
175 As is true with law, this is also true with other types of publications,
like newspapers. The
online editions of the New York Times is sold with a "personal use-only" Terms of Use, which

adds, "copying or storing of any Content for other than personal use is expressly prohibited."
See Abruzzi, supra note 133, at 94.
176 86 F.3d 1447 (7th. Cit. 1996).
17

Id.

Id. at 1454.
See Wrench, LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cit. 2001). In Wrench, the Sixth
Circuit found that state contract law does not always preempt federal copyright law but does
so when "(1) the work is within the scope of the 'subject matter of copyright,' as specified in
17 U.S.C. 5§ 102, 103; and, (2) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any exclusive
rights within the scope of federal copyright as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106." Wrench, 256 F.3d at
453. Applying this legal standard, in Wrench, the court found that preemption did not apply.
's
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publish the Rules), and Fastcase, a low cost legal research platform, currently
180
In the case filed in the Northern
before the Northern District of Georgia.
District of Georgia, Fastcase seeks declaratory judgment that enjoins Lawriter
from impeding Fastcase's own online publication of the Georgia Administrative
Rules and Regulations, and argues Lawriter cannot claim any exclusive right to
81
publish Georgia Regulations.' This case is a refiled federal case after an earlier
82
version of this case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.1
In the original case, instead of asserting a copyright claim over Rules and
Regulations of the State of Georgia, Lawriter conceded that it could not
copyright the law, stating, "Lawriter agrees with Plaintiff that public law must
remain public as a matter of due process. Plaintiff goes to great lengths to
describe how the statutes and regulations adopted as law are not subject to
183
Lawriter asserted
copyright, and Lawriter does not dispute this contention."
that Fastcase had in fact breached its contract, because they had violated the
Terms of Use on the website that required affirmative consent to access the Rules
84
and Regulations of the State of Georgia.1
"On April 7, 2016, Lawriter began requiring persons accessing the Website
85
to consent to an express contract entitled 'Terms of Use"' on their website.1
The Terms of Use agreement has changed a number of times since it was created.
Originally, the contract stated that "You Agree that you will not copy, print, or
download anything from this website other than for your personal use." When
checked on April 18, 2017, that language had changed to "You agree that you
will not copy, print, or download anything from this website for any commercial
use."' 86 Consistently, the Terms of Use has maintained,
You agree that you will not copy, print, or download any portion
of the regulations posted on this site exceeding a single chapter
of regulations for sale, license, or other transfer to a third party,
180 Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00414 (N.D. Ga.) is the current docket after
Fastcase's appeal was successful in Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, No. 17-14110-AA (11th
Cir. 2017).
181 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter LLC, No. 1:17-cv-0041

4

(N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2017).
2
182 See Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, No. 1-16-cv-003 7 (N.D. Ga).
183 Defendant Lawriter, LLC's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,

Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-00327-TCB (ND Ga. June 9, 2016).
184 Id. at 12. Lawriter has a "clickwrap" contract that requires affirmative consent. A user
must check that they have read the terms of use and enter their name in order to be permitted
to see the rules and regulations.
185 Id.
186 See Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Terms and Conditions of Agreement

for Access to Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia Website, http://
rules.sos.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/page.cgi (last visited April 18, 2017).
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except that you may quote a reasonable portion of the
regulations in the course of rendering professional advice."' 87
Thus, Lawriter admits that, "in exchange for access to the
Website, and before obtaining access to the Website, the user
agrees to an express contract not to copy certain information and
to restrict certain potential uses of any information obtained
through the website.188
To state it plainly, Lawriter did not make a copyright claim to the laws it was
providing on its website, but rather asserted a contract claim to restrict a user's
ability to utilize the laws found on its website. Expressly stated, Lawriter believed
it was giving people the opportunity to view the regulations, while simultaneously
restricting their ability to use the information found there in any way that violated
the Terms of Use.
On January 26, 2017, the Northern District of Georgia dismissed Fastcase's
case against Lawriter, asserting that without the copyright claim, there was no
longer clear federal jurisdiction to hear the suit.' 89 The court noted that Lawriter
never registered a copyright of the materials at issue, and thus, there was no
federal copyright claim.1 90 In regard to the court having diversity jurisdiction to
hear the remaining contract-based claim, the court noted there was not enough
evidence to show that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.191 Fastcase
refiled the case in the same court alleging more particular facts to argue that
diversity jurisdiction exists and that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000.192 Again, even with more particular facts alleged, the district court
dismissed Fastcase's claim for lack of jurisdiction.' 93 The case has now been
remanded back to the District Court after its dismissal on jurisdictional grounds
was overturned on appeal.1 94 Therefore, there is no final court ruling on the
merits of Lawriter's claim that they can protect the uses of the administrative
code that they display on their webpage, including restricting the ability for any
user to "copy, print, or download," any portion of the regulations that exceed a

187 Id.
188 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 144, at 12.
189 Order, Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, No 1:16-cv-327-TCB
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2017).
190 Id. at 5.

191 Id. at 11.
192 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Fastcase, Inc. v.
Lawriter LLC, 1:17-cv-00414
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2017). Fastcase alleged in its pleadings that the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000 noting that it was under contract with the Georgia Bar Association to
provide electronic access to all of its members with Georgia primary law, including the Georgia
Administrative Code.
193 See Order Granting Motion for Dimissal, No. 1:17-cv-00414 (N.D. Ga. Jul. 17, 2017).
194 See Fastcase, Inc. v. Lawriter, LLC, 907 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
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95
This
third party in order to transfer that information to any third party.1
memory
other
any
or
restriction on use directly affects libraries, archives,
institution from preserving the law of Georgia.
In its argument that such restrictions in the Terms of Use are allowable under
96
the law, Lawriter asserted that the breach of contract is a basic state law claim.1
They further asserted and continue to assert on appeal, that they had not
registered a copyright and thus, no copyright claim could preempt the application
97
of state contract law.1 In addition to arguing the right to dictate the terms of
use for the Official Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Lawriter also
made the argument that the Terms of Use "do not purport to prohibit or restrict
any copies of the Georgia regulations, other than those obtained from the
98
Of course, this in effect
Website maintained and published by Lawriter."'
restricts the ability for anyone to copy the Georgia regulations, because Georgia
does not publish an administrative code independently of its contract with
Lawriter and states that Lawriter is the official publisher on its own website. In
fact, in Georgia's Contract for Services with Georgia, the parties note that the
publication by Lawriter is publishing a compilation of the Georgia
Administrative Rules and Regulations "in order to satisfy the duties of GASOS
in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated Section 50-13-7."199 That section of
the Georgia Code requires the Secretary of State to "compile, index, and publish
in print or electronically all rules adopted by each agency and remaining in
effect." 200 In its contract with Lawriter, the Secretary of State effectively delegates
its responsibility for publishing the compiled rules and regulations of Georgia,
20
and pays Lawriter $20,000 to carry-out this statutory responsibility. 1 Thus, there
is no independent compilation of state rules and regulations apart from those put
together by Lawriter, since the Secretary of State has ceded its statutory
obligation to provide a compilation to the public to Lawriter, a private entity.
Not only does that mean that the official law is locked behind a paywall, but it
also means that no user can access the Official Rules and Regulations of the State
of Georgia without giving up rights of use to what should be in the public

domain.

195~ Id.
196

Id. at 1339.

197

Id.

198 Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 144, at 13.
199 See Contract for Services, Exhibit A, Affidavit of David Harriman, Fastcase, Inc. v.
Lawriter, LLC, 1:16-CV-00327-TCB (June 9, 2016).
200 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-7 (2017).
201 See Contract for Services, supranote 157.
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C. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT

Users who seek official electronic versions of the law guarded by private
publishers who limit access and use to that information with strict terms of use
and click contracts additionally must be wary of civil liability or criminal
prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act creates a federal criminal cause of action as well as a civil action
for intentional unauthorized access or exceeding authorized access to any
information from any protected computer. 202 Although the Act was created
primarily to combat computer hacking, it is controversial because of its vast
scope. 203At first glance, this statute may not seem to affect seekers of legal
information online, and has most specifically been applied in the context of
employees accessing company or client information via work computers. 204
However, as an increasing number of laws are available online only behind click
terms of use contracts and maintained by private publishers, questions emerge
about whether the reach of the CFAA could potentially affect online users of
legal information if they violate terms of use contracts. Some precedent exists
for the use of the CFAA as a prosecutorial tool against individuals who exceed
terms of use when engaged in research. 205 To that end, the question of what
"exceeds authorized use" becomes relevant; circuits are split on this question for
purposes of violating the criminal statute. 206 The narrow reading of the CFAA
adopted by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits potentially would not be as
problematic to users of what should be freely available digital legal information,
since courts would not be concerned with "use" to determine if access was
unauthorized or exceeded authorization. The broader views taken by other
courts could potentially be problematic for users of legal information
confronting privately published websites with strict terms of use policies.
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have argued for a narrow reading of the
CFAA, specifically to not include prosecutions that target the "misuse or

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127
HARV. L. REv. 751 (2013).
204 See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Exceeding AuthoriZed
Access in the
Workplace: ProsecutingDisloyalConduct Under the ComputerFraudand Abuse Act, 50 AM/ Bus. L.J.
281,281-82 (2013).
205 The case of Aaron Schwartz, a prominent computer programmer charged
with violating
the CFAA for downloading millions of articles from JSTOR, a non-profit subscription
database of academic journals, illustrates an aggressive use of the CFAA to bring criminal
charges for unauthorized use of a research database. See Allison D. Burroughs, Benjamin L.
Mack & Heather B. Repicky, When is Hacking a Crime? PotentialRevisions to the CFAA, 58
BOSTON BARJ. 13 (Summer 2014).
206 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW §9:42 Federal Computer Fraud
and
Abuse Act - Unauthorized Access and Exceeding Access (2018).
202
2
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207
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in
misappropriation" of computer information.
access' in the CFAA does not
authorized
Nosal ruled "that the phrase 'exceeds
208
a Nosal reading, it is unlikely
Under
extend to violations of use restrictions."
content from a website in
takes
who
that a user of online legal information
under the CFAA. Any
be
prosecuted
would
use
violation of the stated terms of
not actionable under
is
access
authorized
misuse of information that results from
only results when
use"
unauthorized
this reading of the CFAA, rather "exceeding
which he or she
to
information
underlying
a user did not have access to the
209
obtained access.
However, in other jurisdictions, courts have taken a broader view of the
CFAA, arguing that each time the statute has been amended, it has been amended
to expand the reach of the CFAA, not narrow it.210 The Seventh Circuit has
argued for a broader view, articulating that the moment that an employee's
actions exceed the authorization given by the employer at the same moment that
211
the employee "acquires a [subjectively adverse] interest to [the employer]."
Under this view, misappropriation of data indicates that an employee exceeded
212
Such a view could be problematic for users
authorized access under the CFAA.
of legal information who could be limited in how they use legal information on
websites governed by strict terms of use.
Still, other jurisdictions, like the First Circuit adopt the "contract" view of the
CFAA, in which an employee exceeds authorized access "if he or she accesses
information and uses it for purposes that are explicitly prohibited by the
213
In the case EF CulturalTravelBV v. Zefer Corp.,
employer or computer owner."
the First Circuit held that a travel website could have explicitly stated "what is
forbidden" with regard to the use of scrapers by rival websites and thus give "fair

207 See U.S. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-3 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast,
535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("mhese courts recognize that the plain language of
the CFAA 'target[s] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of information, not its misuse
or misappropriation."') (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fourth Circuit similarly
decided to invoke the rule of lenity when interpreting the CFAA concluding "that an employee
'exceeds authorized access' when he has approval to access a computer, but uses his access to
obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of his approved access." WEC
Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012).
208 Id at 863.
209 See Robert Brownstone, Tyler G. Newby 1 DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW 5 9:14 (2017).
210 See Audra A. Dial and John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Disloyal
Employees: How FarShould the Statute Go to ProtectEmployersfrom Trade Secret Theft" 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 1447, 1462 (2013).
211 International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2006).
212 Forge Indus. Staffing, Inc. v. De La Fuente, 2006 WL 2982139 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
213 Brownstone and Newby, supra note 165.
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warning." 214 The Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuits have also signaled their
adoption of this view. 215 This view could be particularly problematic for users
of legal information who obtain legal information from websites guarded with a
Terms of Use notice that restricts how they can use the legal information that
they obtain from that website.
Unfortunately, some of the problematic electronic publications of law
highlighted in this article are found in jurisdictions with a broader view of what
"exceeds authorized access" under the CFAA. 216 This means users who have no
other option but to obtain the law through restricted websites potentially could
be subject to criminal or civil action for violations of a publisher's electronic
terms of use depending upon in which jurisdiction.they find themselves.
Researchers in other disciplines have confronted the possibility of CFAA
actions because of differing interpretations by the circuits. Most notably in 2016,
four professors and a media organization involved in studies of racial
discrimination in online real estate, finance, and employment transactions filed
suit in the DC District to determine the reach of the CFAA and whether or not
the CFAA violates the 1st Amendment. 217 In March 2018, Judge John D. Bates
entered a memorandum order dismissing the majority of the researchers' claims
on a 12(b)(1) motion by the government. 218 The court did not dismiss the
researchers' as-applied First Amendment claim, and litigation on this claim is
ongoing at the time that this article is being drafted. In its Memorandum Order,
the court noted that courts are split as how to read the "exceeds authorized
access" provision of the CFAA and the DC Circuit had never opined in regard
214 318 F.3d 58, 63-4 (1st Cir. 2003). (denying the need for a "reasonable
expectations"
standard, instead stating that "public website providers ought to say just what non-password
protected access they purport to forbid.").
215 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cit. 2010) (holding
that the defendant's
conviction of the CFAA did not constitute manifest miscarriage of justice when defendant
exceeded her authorized use of employer's computer to perpetuate a fraud in violation of her
employer, Citigroup's employee policies, of which she was aware). United States v. Rodnjgue,
628 F.3d 1258 (11th Circ. 2010) (holding that a federal employee did exceed his authorized
access and thus violated the CFAA when he used his authorization to look up personal details
in the Social Security Database which violated the Social Security Administration's written
policies that prohibited employee access to the database without a business reason).
216 For example, the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia is jurisdictionally
in the
Eleventh Circuit, a contract view state.
217 Complaint, Sandvig v. Sessions, No. 1:16-cv-01368-JDB (D. DC
June 29, 2016).
218 Memorandum Opinion, Sandvig v. Sessions, No.
1:16-cv-01368-JDB (D. DC Mar 30,
2018). Specifically, the judge dismissed the researchers' First Amendment claims based under
the Petition Clause, based on facially overbreadth claims, and based upon vagueness claims.
The court also dismissed the researchers' claims under the private nondelegation doctrine,
which they said courts can avoid by giving "narrow constructions to statutory delegations that
might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional." (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989)).
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219
to that circuit split. Because the controlling DC Circuit had never weighed in
regarding the correct reading of the CFAA, Judge Bates opined that the "narrow
interpretation adopted by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits - and by
numerous other district judges in this Circuit - to be the best reading of the
statute." 220 The fact that Judge Bates adopted the narrow interpretation of the
CFAA weighed critically in the dismissal, as he wrote "This case raises important
questions about the government's ability to criminalize vast swaths of everyday
activity on the Internet. However, the court need not answer all of them today,
because it concludes that the CFAA prohibits far less than the parties claim (or
22
fear) it does." 1 Had the case been brought in a jurisdiction with a more
sweeping interpretation of the CFAA, the outcome may not have been the same.
The CFAA, as currently written and interpreted across jurisdictions, leaves
troubling questions about the ability of citizens across the country to access their
states' laws when access to those laws is governed by terms of use maintained by
private publishers in contractual relationships with state governments. In the
following section, possible fixes to the uncertainty created by the present state
of the law are discussed.

IV. RETURNING OWNERSHIP OF THE LAW TO THE PUBLIC
The purpose of this article is to shine a light on the legal publishing system
in the United States and how it has evolved to provide inefficient, insufficient
access to the public. The problem is not just a copyright problem, nor is itjust a
problem with the legal publishing marketplace, online licensing norms, or
government funding. One of the things that makes this problem especially
complex is that each state has its own unique publication scheme, making it
difficult to propose complete solutions to confront every challenge facing public
access to the law. Nevertheless, there are clear areas where progress is needed,
and the variety of actors who can work to facilitate ensuring the public has access
to the law.
Firstly, state governments should confront the reality that publishing models
for print laws do not readily translate to publishing laws in an electronic-only
environment. In a print world with physical products, partnerships with private
publishers to defray the costs of publication made sense. The public could have
access to the law through distribution of print laws to public libraries across a
particular state, so the cost of access to the public was free (aside from the cost
of transportation to a public library and the time it may take to access the law

219
220
221

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 27. (noting "the statutory context buttresses the narrower reading of the text.").
Id. at 44.
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there). Private publishers could recoup costs through sales to libraries, law firms,
courts, and other legal institutions.
In an online world, requiring users to purchase access to the law violates the
norms of access to the law. By restricting online access, no longer can libraries
provide free access to members of the public. State governments choosing to
contract with private publishers to provide online access to the law should
recognize that private publishers limiting access to the law through click
contracts, requirements for payment, or any other means violate the legal
expectation that the law should be freely accessible to all who are expected to
abide by it.
Based on this recognition, there are several possible fixes for state
governments, state courts, private publishers, libraries, and other freedom of
information advocates to bring the law back to the public domain.
A. STATE GOVERNMENTS

State governments have the largest role to play in ensuring the public has
access to official law in an electronic format. 222 In an ideal world, state
governments would fully adapt and enforce UELMA as well as adapt laws that
go beyond UELMA to explicitly state legal materials in their state could not be
copyrighted nor access to them be limited by the use of contracts. Ideally, all
laws would be published by the state governments themselves (functioning as a
state version of the federal Government Publishing Office) and financed
adequately with state government funding to ensure that information is kept
reliable, up-to-date, and previous versions are preserved. Reprinting, copying,
and sharing files would be freely permissible across different legal research
platforms and on the open web, while the government would maintain
safeguards to the reliability of an "official" version that could authoritatively be
used in legal disputes.
Governments that seek to simplify their work by "adopting" or
"incorporating by reference" standards produced by private organizations
should compensate the private organizations for their work, and then make any
adopted legal standard freely available to the public.
Although it is unlikely that all states will publish all of their laws in an official
format available online, at a bare minimum, state governments should ensure
that they designate, by law, which version of a code is official. If a code is not
designated as official, disclaimer language should clearly indicate this on the
code's webpage. If the "official" version of a statute or a regulation can only be
222 See "Principles & Core Values Concerning Public Information
on Government
Websites," AMERICAN AssOCIATION OF LAW LIBRAlIES, https://www.aallnet.org/wp0 7
content/uploads/2018/
/Principles-Core-Values-Concerning-Public-Information-Govt-

Websites-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
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found in a session law or in a version of a "register", then the disclaimer should
indicate this as well. If an online version is designated as official, then the official
version should be made freely available to the public with no terms of use to
3
restrict usage of the law.22 Official online versions should have adequate
preservation plans in place, or state governments should partner with memory
institutions like state archives or libraries to ensure that preservation is achieved.
This is particularly true for states that have not passed UELMA. Currently, at
least twenty states publish only electronic official codes of regulations. Of those,
ten states have not passed UELMA, meaning that there is no statutory obligation
to preserve the official version of the regulatory code. Even in states that have
passed UELMA, preservation of electronic administrative codes is not always
clear. For example, Colorado publishes its official regulations online, but it lacks
224
a mechanism to view historical regulations required under UELMA.
There are some good examples of state efforts to publish law online in an
official format that is preserved. For example, Connecticut publishes its code of
regulations through its eRegulations website, which as of July 1, 2017 became
5
the official version of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.22 The current
version of the regulations is available, as well as a database that allows users to
search regulatory history back to 2015.
B. STATE COURTS

State courts should make all judicial decrees, and especially any judicial
decisions and opinions, freely available through their own court websites. This
would alleviate the problem that users face where, depending on the electronic
database they pay to use, they may have access to different and exclusive
opinions. One additional possibility previously discussed is that state courts
could partner with state or academic libraries to archive and preserve all
electronic court opinions. For example, in New Jersey the state courts partner
with Rutgers University Law Library to preserve and make available to the public
official court opinions. Large libraries have the expertise to help courts preserve
opinions electronically and also make them searchable and findable to the
226
public.

See discussion below under "Private Publishers."
224 CODE OF COLORADO REGULATIONS, https://www.sos.state.co.us/CCR/Welcome.do
(last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
225 See "Official Version Statement," CONNECTICUT EREGULATIONS SYsTEM, https://
eregulations.ct.gov/eRegsPortal/Information/Index/BetaNote (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
226 See New Jersey Courts Search Page, RUTGERS, http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/courts/
search.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
223
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Additionally, when different versions of a court opinion appear online, it
should be clear to the reader which version is the official, final opinion.
Disclaimers should clearly indicate when opinions are not final and are still being
reviewed. A thornier issue that should be resolved with clear direction from the
courts is the issue of designating cases as precedential. In a world where all cases
are published electronically and freely available online, should certain cases still
be designated as precedential? We are aware there are two competing views to
this issue that pit judicial economy arguments against arguments over due
process. It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to resolve this issue, but
insofar as the public has a right to know and understand which cases are "the
law" and have precedential value, this is an argument that needs resolution. In
our common law tradition, a clear understanding of judicial authority has shaped
the development of the law. Without resolution, these questions will only
become more complex in the future with more and more case decisions available
to legal practitioners, scholars, and the general public.
C. LAW LIBRARIES

Even in the absence of legislative solutions to the problems described in this
article, there are a myriad of steps law libraries, particularly state law libraries and
large, academic law libraries, can take with regard to ensuring that legal
information is accessible and preserved. In addition to advocacy efforts librarians
may take to push their governments towards more accessible law and legal
information, libraries can involve themselves in digitization efforts, efforts to
preserve digital content, and provide metadata and other finding tools for
electronic legal information.
Because some private publishers of state legal information maintain they
possess copyright over legal information they publish, this can inhibit some
library actors from feeling empowered to do anything with online legal
information. Libraries, particularly those supported by the state, or instruments
of state institutions, should feel little hesitation when it comes to copying,
storing, or making available the law that is restricted by private publishers. 227
Librarians can assist in preservation of online legal information by
independently storing versions of the law, keeping previous versions for
themselves, and not relying on private publishers (who may go out of business
2
Libraries should take into account the legal restrictions noted earlier in this article, but in
general the risk of legal action against libraries acting in good faith to provide public access is

less than for many others. See DAviD R. HANSEN, DIGITIZING ORPHAN Wous : LEGAL
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RISKS FOR OPEN ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED ORPHAN WORKS , 111

(Kyle K. Courtney & Peter Suber Eds., Harvard Library 2016), https://dash.harvard.edu/
handle/1/27840430 (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
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or change approaches to publishing at any time) or state actors (whose priorities
and funding may change over time) to keep all versions of the law indefinitely.
Law libraries already preserve old copies of print legal materials; it is not a stretch
of a library's workflow to imagine similar practices in the world of online legal
information.
One ongoing problem with electronically-published law is that it is often
unaccompanied by the tools that make it usable to people who are not practiced
in understanding the law. In the past, seekers of legal information would need to
go to a law library in order to access the law where they might also speak with a
trained reference librarian who could help them find law most applicable to their
questions and understand the organization and authority of the law they were
referencing. Although it is now seemingly easier to access the law electronically,
it may be more difficult for an untrained person to find the law most relevant to
their legal needs or understand how it is structured. Law libraries could assist in
making the law more approachable and understandable by building search tools,
explainers, and research assistance meant to complement freely available online
legal databases. Technical services librarians are masters of metadata and
database design.
D. PRIVATE PUBLISHERS

Private publishers contracting with state governments to electronically
publish primary law have a responsibility to ensure that the law is freely accessible
to members of the public, as they are acting as an arm of the state. To that end,
publishers should provide a free official (if contracted with the state government
to do so) version that is up to date and complete. Prior official versions of the
law should similarly be available freely with no usage restrictions. When private
publishers enter into contracts to publish laws for a state, states should pay the
full cost of publication to the publisher. Private publishers should not have to
recoup the costs of publication, either in print or electronic format, by charging
members of the public for access to their laws. Taxpayers have already paid for
the laws that govern them to be created through legislative, administrative, and
judicial processes. Members of the public should not be charged again by private
publishers who have not been adequately compensated by state governments for
their publishing efforts.
Additionally, when private publishers contract with the state to publish
official versions of the laws, the contract should explicitly state that terms of use
to restrict access and use of free versions of the law shall not be permitted.
Downloading laws, copying, printing, and other uses should be freely allowed to
to
give users full rights. Private publishers should not create private markets
law.
the
to
public information nor should they become gatekeepers
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To the extent that private publishers seek to profit from the publication of
public law, it should only be for "value-added" features beyond the publication
of the law in its original organization and format that is used for citation in the
courts. Such "value-added" features that a publisher could charge additional
funds for include: citators, unofficial annotations, or research finding aids and
tools. Legal publishers can profit from added features created through their own
innovation; they should not profit from providing basic access to the law.
E. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ADVOCATES

There is a continued need for access to government information advocates
to seek redress for information that is kept from being freely available to the
public through the courts. This article has highlighted some ongoing litigation
that does just that. Until we live in an information environment where all states
provide free access to official, authentic laws, then such litigation should
continue to create a body of law that makes clear that in the new information
environment, the obligation of states to publish the law is unchanged.
Additionally, advocates and interest organizations for access to government
information need to continue to push their elected officials to modify laws which
restrict access to the law. This article has highlighted a number of problematic
legal areas where modification of existing statutes would ease access and use
issues.
For example, because of the varied interpretations of CFAA, advocates
should push for the law to be amended in particular with regard to the
problematic "exceeds authorized use" language. In response to the death of
Aaron Schwartz, advocates of changes to the CFAA begin pushing "Aaron's
Law" which would eliminate the "exceeds authorized access" language in the
CFAA. 8 The revisions to the CFAA "would decriminalize violations of an
agreement, policy, duty, or contractual obligation regarding Internet or computer
use," and bring the language of the statute in line with court readings of the
statute like Nosal in the Ninth Circuit. 9 Unfortunately, these proposed
amendments have been stalled in committee with no momentum in Congress in
many years. Advocates for free access to law sould make a renewed push for
Congress to reconsider these amendments.

228 See Burroughs et al., supra note 163. (Contending the bill would also amend the CFAA to
define "access without authorization" to include only obtaining "information on a protected
computer" that the "accesser lacks authorization to obtain" by "knowingly circumventing one
or more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent
unauthorized individuals from obtaining or altering that information.").
229 fd.
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V. CONCLUSION
The advent of online publication of the law has not necessarily changed the
relationship between private publishers and state governments. However, it has
changed the dynamic for the public in accessing the law. The Internet holds the
promise of greater access to the law, but at the same time, also holds the peril of
restricting access to the law. We stand at a crossroads: it is time for state
governments to reaffirm the democratic principles that underlie public access to
the law and ensure that citizens of today and the future have robust access to the
laws that govern them.

